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ABSTRACT 
In interpersonal interactions, socially anxious individuals continuously monitor for social threats 
and fear negative evaluation from their peers. We know little about whether these cognitive 
biases correlate with patterns of brain function in relevant regions that have been associated with 
evaluation of self and others. Recent evidence implicates neural structures critical to perspective-
taking and the processing of uncertainty may function atypically in those who are anxious. In the 
present study, we examined neural activity in two such regions of the brain—the temporoparietal 
junction and the anterior midcingulate cortex — during Prisoner’s Dilemma game play. There 
were no significant group differences in activation in both regions during the processing of 
partner choice and anticipation of outcome during gameplay. However, there were significant 
differences in the processing of social feedback. These findings provide evidence that Prisoner’s 
Dilemma researchers should begin to consider how social and monetary context affects decision-
making in diverse populations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Social Anxiety 
1.1.1 Prevalence and Phenomenology  
Social anxiety (SA) is characterized by fear of embarrassment, criticism, humiliation, or 
rejection, as well as high levels of distress and avoidance in social or performance situations 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Cognitive research has demonstrated that SA is also 
associated with sensitivity to social threat and uncertainty in ambiguous social situations (Clark 
& Wells, 1995; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Although in a given year 
roughly 6.8% of the United States population meets diagnostic criteria for Social Anxiety 
Disorder (SAD), which is an extreme manifestation, SA more commonly occurs at subclinical 
levels, affecting up to 18.38% of people at a subclinical level and 23.07% at a symptomatic level 
(one DSM-IV criterion missing/two or more criteria missing, respectively) (Knappe, Fehm, & 
Wittchen, 2009). 
People who are socially anxious often display negative interpretative biases, or a 
tendency to interpret neutral or ambiguous social information as unfavorable, leading them to 
ruminate about the possibility that social interactions will fail (Badra et al., 2016; Miers, Blöte, 
Bögels, & Westenberg, 2008; Walsh, McNally, Skariah, Butt, & Eysenck, 2015).  Moreover, 
they often inaccurately attribute negative emotions and intentions to others based on their facial 
expressions or other visible cues (Button, Lewis, Penton-Voak, & Munafò, 2013; Hezel & 
McNally, 2014). Finally, individuals with SA exhibit a propensity to avoid uncertainty in socio-
evaluative situations, presumably because they fear that they will be unable to respond 
competently in the face of uncertain events (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). 
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However, SA doesn’t appear to be best defined as a categorical construct (i.e., one either 
has it or one does not), even though the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) (American Psychological Association [APA], 2013) and International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) (National Center for Health Statistics, 2015) diagnostic systems have 
traditionally conceptualized it in a categorical format.  According to these diagnostic systems, 
decisions about whether treatment is warranted are based on the number of symptoms displayed 
and the degree to which they impair functioning. However, researchers and clinicians have 
expressed concern that diagnostic cut points may be arbitrarily determined, and thus many 
scholars have embraced the notion that the symptoms that characterize SA exist on a spectrum 
and can be analyzed dimensionally (Schneier, Blanco, Antia, & Liebowitz, 2002; Stein, Ono, 
Tajima, & Muller, 2004).   
Recent evidence suggests that SA, even at subclinical levels, has distinct cognitive, 
behavioral, and emotional correlates. One study examining reactivity to social stress, for 
example, revealed associations between subclinical SA symptoms and increased state anxiety, 
biased appraisals associated with the probability and costs of negative social evaluations, 
changes in facial expression that signaled anxiety, and lower cortisol reactivity (Crişan, Vulturar, 
Miclea, & Miu, 2016). Another study examined the generation of automatic thoughts, imagery 
and safety behaviors in individuals with high self-reported social anxiety, people with clinician-
diagnosed clinical/subclinical social phobia, and controls (Ranta, Tuomisto, Kaltiala-Heino, 
Rantanen, & Marttunen, 2014). Participants completed a thought-listing procedure in which they 
were given a target situation and told to list the kind of thoughts, perspective images, and coping 
strategies they would use in those situations. Individuals in both anxiety groups showed a 
significant elevation in reported negative automatic thoughts, observer-perspective images 
3 
(negative self-images seen from an observers perspective), and safety behaviors (e.g. stuttering, 
speaking quietly, avoiding eye gaze). Furthermore the frequency was comparable to that 
observed in previous studies of SAD samples (Alfano, Beidel, & Turner, 2006; Rheingold, 
Herbert, et al., 2003; Hignett & Cartwright-Hatton, 2008; Hodson, McManus, et al., 2008).   
Considerable evidence thus suggests that subclinical SA is associated with significant 
changes in emotional experience, cognitive appraisals, and behaviors that parallel those found in 
samples with SAD. However, less is known about whether the neural correlates of SA are 
comparable between those whose symptoms exceed diagnostic thresholds and those whose 
symptoms do not. Neuroimaging research on subclinical SA could help address this question; it 
could also provide information about the utility of a dimensional perspective as opposed to a 
Gaussian distribution framework, for understanding SA. 
1.2 Anatomy and Physiology 
1.2.1 Clinical Social Anxiety 
Two recent literature reviews on clinical SA and its neurobiological correlates identified 
dysfunction in five key neural regions: the amygdala, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), the insula, the hippocampus, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Freitas-
Ferrari et al., 2010; Pietrini et al., 2010). Those findings strongly suggest the presence of 
functional abnormalities in the neural systems involved in the manifestation of fear (Lang, 
McTeague, & Bradley, 2014), in the processing of emotional stimuli (Etkin & Wager, 2007), in 
awareness of self (Stein, 2015), and in the evaluation of others' intentions (Plana, Lavoie, 
Battaglia, & Achim, 2014). Of the brain regions that have been linked to SA, the amygdala is the 
most thoroughly studied (Etkin & Wager, 2007; Tovote, Fadok, & Lüthi, 2015); this focus 
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highlights the field’s emphasis to date on aberrant emotional and fear processing as the primary 
indicators of SA. 
Early research focused almost exclusively on the amygdala as a key player in human 
SAD, due to its well-documented role in fear and visceral emotional responses in other species 
(Berntson, Sarter, & Cacioppo, 2003; McDonald, 1998; Price, 2003).  Birbaumer and colleagues 
(1998) were among the first to examine amygdala responses to stimuli that are relevant to SAD 
in a human population. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), they showed that 
the amygdala selectively activated when people were exposed to potentially fear-relevant face 
stimuli (Birbaumer et al., 1998). A large number of neuroimaging studies subsequently have 
found that people with SAD show more elevated amygdala activity in comparison to the 
neurotypical population when they view threatening faces (Beesdo et al., 2009; Cannistraro & 
Rauch, 2003; Kent & Rauch, 2003; Shah, Klumpp, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2009). SAD has 
also been linked to atypical amygdala activity in response to ambiguous faces (Cooney, Atlas, 
Joormann, Eugène, & Gotlib, 2006; Evans et al., 2008; Phan, Fitzgerald, Nathan, & Tancer, 
2006; Stein, Goldin, Sareen, Zorrilla, & Brown, 2002), which suggests that affected individuals 
are sensitive not only to overt threat cues, but also to those that are vague or undefined in nature. 
Another region of the brain commonly implicated in socially anxious people’s atypical 
responses to social cues is the prefrontal cortex, which plays key roles in the regulation and 
modulation of initial emotional responses generated from the amygdala (Ball, Ramsawh, 
Campbell-Sills, Paulus, & Stein, 2013; Lee, Heller, van Reekum, Nelson, & Davidson, 2012).  
The vmPFC also appears to play a critical role throughout prefrontal cortex development in 
mediating and organizing flexible social behaviors that include valuation, inhibition, and rule use 
(Nelson & Guyer, 2011).  In addition, it is activated during self-referential processing and self-
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awareness (Kim & Johnson, 2012, 2015) as well as decision-making (Hebscher & Gilboa, 2016; 
Kuss et al., 2015), all of which are cognitive domains in which individuals with SA consistently 
report varying degrees of abnormalities. 
Findings of aberrant amygdala and vmPFC responses in the context of SA have been 
reinforced by evidence of reduced functional connectivity between the amygdala and the 
vmPFC, whether the individual being scanned is at rest or participating in a behavioral task (see 
Figure 1) (Kim, Gee, Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2011; Klumpp, Keutmann, Fitzgerald, 
Shankman, & Phan, 2014; Prater, Hosanagar, Klumpp, Angstadt, & Phan, 2013). Based on such 
studies, a widely acknowledged model of fear in SA has emerged, in which dissociation between 
the amygdala and vmPFC leads to dysfunctional processing of internal or external threats, as 
well as to exaggerated physiological and emotional responses to those cues (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 
2010). 
 
 
Figure 1 Kim et al. (2011) showing reduced functional connectivity between amygdala 
and vmPFC at rest in socially anxious individuals and increased connectivity between amygdala 
and dmPFC in low anxious subjects. Adapted from “Anxiety Dissociates Dorsal and Ventral 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex Functional Connectivity with the Amygdala at Rest” by M. J. Kim, D. 
Gee, etc., 2011, Cerebral Cortex, 21(7), p. 1667-73. Copyright 2010 by Oxford University Press. 
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1.2.2 Subclinical Social Anxiety 
Subclinical SA also appears to be associated with atypical patterns of brain function, but 
these patterns vary across studies and differ in the degree to which they correspond with those 
observed in clinically diagnosed samples (Abraham et al., 2013; Carré et al., 2014; Duval et al., 
2013). Specifically, the patterns of activation reported in subclinical SA samples diverge from 
the abnormalities in recruitment and connectivity seen in the literature that has focused on 
emotional expression and regulation in clinical SA.  
A diverse array of tasks, including facial emotion processing paradigms, has been used to 
examine neural correlates of emotional response to social threat in subclinical populations. 
Although BOLD activity differed between participants with subclinical SA and controls in at 
least two studies, these differences were found in regions seldom implicated in prototypical 
models of clinical SA; these regions included the anterior insula, lateral prefrontal cortex, and the 
anterior cingulate (Carré et al., 2014; Duval et al., 2013). Other research has focused explicitly 
on brain activity associated with fear of negative evaluation in response to negative self-
referential statements in adults with subclinical SA (Abraham et al., 2013). Although this study 
found evidence of elevated activation in the vmPFC and the amygdala within all participants, no 
group differences between subclinical SA and healthy controls were apparent. These findings 
differ notably from those of a similar study that compared activation in the same neural 
structures between adults with clinical SA and non-anxious controls (K. Blair et al., 2008). 
Taken together, these two studies raise the possibility that atypical fear circuit functioning, at 
least in response to negative self-referential statements, may only be detectable in the presence of 
severe SA symptoms like those that characterize individuals with SAD. 
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Due in part to the divergent findings seen in clinical and non-clinical samples, there has 
been a recent surge of interest in looking beyond exaggerated emotional response in the 
amygdala within clinical and subclinical SA and examining more complex, distributed patterns 
of atypical neural activity (Gentili et al., 2009, 2016). This shift has led researchers to identify a 
broader set of brain regions in which atypical activity may underlie the maladaptive cognitive 
biases apparent in socially anxious people. Of particular interest for this study are regions 
engaged while people are evaluating social cues and their meanings, as well as regions engaged 
during periods of anticipation and uncertainty during a social interaction.   
Inherent in interpersonal interaction is the need to determine what others might be 
thinking or feeling (Gentili et al., 2009; Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). This process involves 
discerning the other person’s perspective and attributing meaning to the perspective and is 
commonly termed Theory of Mind (ToM) (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015; Mahy, Moses, 
& Pfeifer, 2014). Given that the cognitive biases associated with SA include a tendency to 
assume that others will be critical of one’s behavior, regions of the brain that implement ToM 
warrant attention as possible seats of atypical activation in SA. 
1.3  Social Evaluation in Anxiety 
1.3.1 Theory and Cognitive Model 
Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg  (1997) developed two widely-cited 
and highly-regarded cognitive models of SA that are distinct, but compatible, and that 
underscore the ways in which socially anxious people evaluate their social environment in 
dysfunctional ways. According to Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, when anxious individuals 
enter social situations, previous emotionally salient experiences interact with cognitive and 
behavioral predispositions to negatively bias their perceptions of themselves and the perspectives 
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of people with whom they are interacting. Further, they tend to fixate on internal cues that could 
signal an anxious response, such as an accelerated heart rate. As a function of their biased 
perceptions and excessive internal focus, people with SA tend to assume that they will behave 
incompetently, that catastrophic consequences will ensue, and that they will thus lose worth and 
social standing.  
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) contended that individuals with SA are inherently critical of 
themselves. They thus assume that others will hold them to similarly excessive standards and 
evaluate them negatively.  Socially anxious people’s negative internal representations of their 
appearance and behavior conflicts with the perfect image that they imagine that their “audience” 
should not only see, but also unequivocally expects from them. This leads them to be 
hypervigilant and attentive to the possibility of negative evaluation from their “audience”, 
particularly from people whose opinions they value the most. 
Thus, socially anxious people should be more likely than most to dwell on the thoughts 
and feelings that others may be having about them. Furthermore, as Hofmann’s (2007) 
comprehensive cognitive model of social anxiety suggests, the implications of this thought 
process are likely to be uncomfortable and to bias how socially anxious people perceive the 
results of their interactions with others (see Figure 2). According to this model, in cases of 
potential social evaluation, vulnerable individuals overestimate not only the probability that a 
social situation will have a negative outcome, but also the likelihood that that outcome will come 
with heavy social costs and possible negative consequences that will influence future interactions 
with their peers. They also tend to underestimate the likelihood of engaging in positive 
exchanges with their peers that will have no bearing on their overall social standing. 
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Figure 2 Hofmann’s (2007) comprehensive cognitive model of social anxiety. Adapted 
from “Cognitive Factors that Maintain Social Anxiety Disorder: a Comprehensive Model and its 
Treatment Implications” By S. Hoffman, 2007, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, 36(4), p. 193-209. 
Copyright 2007 by Taylor & Francis. 
 
Together, the tendencies among socially anxious people to focus in a negatively biased 
manner on what others may think and feel about them and to assume that others’ negative 
perceptions are highly likely to lead to catastrophic outcomes create a heightened risk that these 
individuals will misread or inaccurately anticipate others’ thoughts and emotions in the context 
of social situations. In other words, they seem likely to show important and potentially 
problematic biases in a set of processes that have been termed “Theory of Mind” (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, C. & Frith, 2005). 
1.4 Theory of Mind 
1.4.1 Definition and Theory 
In a pivotal paper, Premack and Woodruff (1978) questioned whether chimpanzees can 
understand that others may see the world differently than they do. This paper provided an initial 
definition of theory of mind (ToM), or mentalizing, as the ability to attribute mental states such 
as beliefs, intents, desires, knowledge, and pretending to oneself and to others. This ability also 
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requires understanding that others have beliefs, desires, intentions, and objectives that diverge 
from one’s own. Others have since expanded on this construct, noting, for example, that when 
explaining a person’s behavior in terms of a goal, desire, or trait, we recognize that this mental 
representation does not necessarily correspond to our own interpretations of reality (Meltzoff, 
1995). 
1.4.2 ToM and Neural Correlates 
A number of reviews and meta-analytic studies have attempted to uncover the neural 
correlates of ToM reasoning (Frith, C.D. & Frith, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Mitchell, 2009; 
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). The diversity of processes implicated 
suggests that these structures comprise an integrated circuit with components that participate in 
both distinct and overlapping ways in varied aspects of ToM reasoning. However, it is not 
entirely clear which regions of the circuitry are recruited specifically for perspective-taking and 
belief reasoning, both of which could constitute potential mechanisms underlying the cognitive 
bias towards social threat in SA. 
Recent meta-analyses implicate two regions—the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and 
mPFC, as “core” nodal regions that underlie ToM reasoning (Mitchell, 2009; Schurz et al., 
2014). Several lines of evidence converge to support the idea that the TPJ is a key player in this 
type of social cognition, which makes this structure a particularly good candidate as a mediator 
of the biases evident in SA.  First, overwhelming evidence implicates the structure as an essential 
player in mentalizing, which is a general term that encompasses the cognitive processes involved 
in reasoning about the self and others (Frith, C.D. & Frith, 2006; Frith, U. & Frith, 2003). 
Findings from a meta-analysis of over 200 studies show that this region participates heavily in 
the representation of others’ transient or temporary mental states from their perspectives (Van 
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Overwalle, 2009). These mental states include goals, intentions, and beliefs, which are 
represented even when they differ from or are incongruent with our own beliefs.  
Second, the TPJ is responsible for integrating information from the thalamic and limbic 
systems with visual, auditory, and somatosensory cortical information to support social cognition 
(Carter & Huettel, 2013).  The TPJ thus appears to serve as a hub, pulling together data across 
distinct cognitive domains (e.g., perception, attention, memory, and semantics) to facilitate social 
reasoning (see Figure 3). Inefficient or overly effective integration of sensory and contextual 
information in this region could have wide-ranging effects on overall mentalizing ability. 
Third, visual perspective-taking that involves seeing objects or ideas from another 
person’s viewpoint seems to recruit the bilateral TPJ in a variety of contexts (Santiesteban et al., 
2012; Schurz et al., 2015; Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013). For example, the TPJ 
seems to play a critical role in false-belief reasoning, or understanding when and why others may 
hold inaccurate beliefs about the world (Mitchell, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). Recognizing that 
someone has different knowledge about the world than we do is essential if we are to understand 
and adapt to that person’s moment by moment behavior in a social interaction. 
 
Figure 3 Meta-analytic evidence of social function encoding and processing in the TPJ 
(Carter & Huettel, 2013). Adapted from “A Nexus Model of the Temporoparietal Junction”, by 
R. Carter & S. Huettel, 2013, Trends in Cognitive Science, 17(7), p. 328-336. Copyright 2013 by 
Elsevier. 
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In contrast to the TPJ, the other nodal region for ToM—the mPFC—appears to support 
inferences from a first-person perspective about persistent or enduring personality dispositions of 
the self as well as others (Van Overwalle, 2009). The mPFC also seems to play a critical role in 
anticipating what others will do in the future by supporting consideration of what we would do in 
the same situation (Frith, C.D. & Frith, 2006).  Saxe and Powell (2006) suggested that the mPFC 
is generally involved in processing socially or emotionally relevant information about self and 
others, but that it does not participate specifically in belief-desire reasoning (Saxe & Powell, 
2006) as the TPJ appears to do. Indeed, this distinction is one reason underlying suggestions that 
the TPJ is the integral component of a dedicated neural architecture for ToM reasoning that is 
domain-specific and adapted for perspective-taking and intention prediction (Mahy et al., 2014). 
The mPFC does, however, exhibit a high degree of functional connectivity with the TPJ 
(Li, Mai, & Liu, 2014), which raises the possibility that the two structures operate in concert. 
Recent evidence indicates that sub-regions of the mPFC and TPJ play integrated functional roles 
in processing social emotion, as opposed to basic emotion (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009), and in 
making inferences about another person’s emotions versus making inferences about their 
intentions and behavior (Atique, Erb, Gharabaghi, Grodd, & Anders, 2011). This information 
provides clarity to the findings of a recent meta-analysis that indicate that, while a number of 
regions have been implicated in ToM processing, the mPFC and the TPJ are the only candidates 
that are consistently recruited across all ToM tasks (Schurz et al., 2014). 
The TPJ and mPFC play overlapping and reciprocal roles in supporting both self-
referential processing and ToM reasoning (Mars et al., 2012). Each, however, appears to make 
distinct contributions to these socio-cognitive processes and more research is needed to clarify 
their relationship with each other. Broadly, however, the literature points to the TPJ as the 
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predominant player in perspective-taking and belief reasoning (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Krall et 
al., 2015; Van Overwalle, 2009) while the mPFC appears to support more introspective and 
contemplative processes. 
1.4.3 TPJ Involvement in Anticipation and Feedback Appraisal 
A small body of evidence implicates the TPJ in considering social context when 
anticipating negative outcomes. Past research suggests that the TPJ plays roles in the process of 
supplementing subjective evaluation of a person’s decisions by attributing positive or negative 
intentions to them (Liljeholm, Dunne, & O’Doherty, 2014), in the down-regulation of positive 
emotional expression in anticipation of diminished monetary reward (Staudinger, Erk, & Walter, 
2011), and in the anticipation of the experience of guilt following perceived commission of 
moral transgressions (Seara-Cardoso et al., 2016).  
Evidence of the TPJ’s involvement in appraising and processing feedback regarding 
one’s own social decisions is more substantial. The TPJ has been implicated in the appraisal of 
social outcomes in a diverse array of research contexts, such as economic-exchange tasks 
(Archetti & Scheuring, 2011; Grecucci, Giorgetta, Bonini, & Sanfey, 2013; McClure-Tone et al., 
2011), tasks involving exposure to socially contextualized first and third person statements 
(Pfeifer et al., 2017; Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, & Ochsner, 2010; Zhang & Mo, 2016), and tasks 
focused on presentation of conflicting visual and verbal social cues (Zaki, Kallman, Wimmer, 
Ochsner, & Shohamy, 2016). The tendency for socially anxious individuals to fixate on the 
social performance feedback they receive from their peers (Cody, Teachmen,et al. 2010; Nepon, 
Flett, et al. 2011; Smith, Sarason, et al. 1975) is possibly connected to atypical TPJ activity. 
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1.4.4 ToM and Social Anxiety 
Only recently has research begun to consider the ways in which ToM may be relevant to 
SA. Most work to date on SA and ToM has focused on individuals who meet criteria for SAD. In 
two studies that compared performance on ToM tasks [Mind in the Eyes task (MIE; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006)] between adults with and without SAD, individuals 
with SAD made more errors than did non-socially-anxious participants on both ToM tasks 
(Hezel & McNally, 2014; Washburn, Wilson, et al., 2016). Those with SAD also had difficulty 
decoding socially-relevant information. The authors interpreted these findings as indicating that 
individuals with SAD “over-mentalize” or attribute more meaning to social and emotional 
stimuli than is appropriate, given the contexts in which the stimuli appear.  
Yoon and colleagues (Yoon et al., 2016) conducted one of the first fMRI studies to 
examine the neural correlates of ToM, as well as functional connectivity among relevant 
structures during task performance, in adults with and without SAD. Patients, compared to 
controls, exhibited increased memory for faces paired with negative self-referential comments. 
They also exhibited hyperactivation in the TPJ and a number of other relevant structures during 
encoding, but not retrieval. TPJ activity during encoding was positively correlated with scores on 
the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983). The researchers speculated 
that the TPJ hyperactivity observed in the SAD group during encoding may have reflected 
heightened sensitivity to social evaluation by others, which is consistent with the idea that the 
TPJ plays a critical role in socio-evaluative processes.  
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1.5 Uncertainty in Social Anxiety 
1.5.1 Cognitive Theory and Qualitative Evidence 
People with SA appear to become distressed when they are in situations that do not offer 
certainty about what is going to happen next or what action they need to take to ensure positive 
outcomes (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010). Indeed, 
evidence from at least four studies (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & 
Asmundson, 2010; Counsell et al., 2017; Teale Sapach, Carleton, Mulvogue, Weeks, & 
Heimberg, 2015) suggests that people with SA often exhibit intolerance of uncertainty (IU), or a 
tendency “to consider the possibility of a negative event occurring as unacceptable and 
threatening irrespective of the probability of its occurrence” (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 
2007, p. 106). 
Elevated IU appears to relate to a number of problematic cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes. For example, it may impair problem-solving skills, decision-making, and overall 
executive functioning (Koerner & Dugas, 2007). Further, as socially anxious individuals begin to 
experience situations that feel threatening, their heightened IU has the potential to precipitate 
cognitive and behavioral avoidance of ambiguity that might signal additional risk (Lovibond, 
Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009). It remains unclear, however, whether and how the 
brains of socially anxious people respond in distinctive ways to this kind of contextual 
uncertainty.  Anxiety neuroimaging research has primarily focused on emotional reactivity to 
threat in general, with limited attention to the mediators of cognitive processes required to 
execute adaptive behaviors in uncertain settings.  
The construct of uncertainty can be parsed into at least four distinct categories [sensory 
uncertainty (am I perceiving stimuli accurately?), state uncertainty (what is going on right now?), 
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rule uncertainty (what rules should guide my behavior?), and outcome uncertainty (what will 
happen next?)] (Bach & Dolan, 2012). Outcome uncertainty is particularly relevant to the present 
study, because a primary fear for socially anxious people is that their own actions will provoke 
negative responses from others, who are more are less unpredictable.  Using economic exchange 
paradigms, we can capture, quantify, and manipulate others’ unpredictability in the experimental 
context by structuring social interactions according to probabilistic rules about the likelihood that 
a given action will lead to a rewarding or a punishing outcome.  We can thus examine how 
people respond and what regions of the brain are recruited when they can predict with varying 
levels of confidence how likely an outcome is under changing interpersonal dynamics that model 
a real world social dilemma. 
1.5.2 Neural Activity under Conditions of Uncertainty 
Researchers have only recently begun to examine how conditions of uncertainty are 
processed in the brain. Although several brain regions have been implicated (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013), the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), appears to function as a hub that is particularly 
relevant to uncertainty processing in the context of anxiety. According to Grupe and Nitschke’s 
(2013) uncertainty and anticipation model of anxiety (UAMA; see Figure 4), anxious people’s 
difficulties tolerating and responding to uncertain future threats stem from five dysfunctional 
cognitive and emotional processes: inflated estimates of threat cost and probability, increased 
threat attention and hypervigilance, deficient safety learning, behavioral and cognitive 
avoidance, and heightened reactivity to threat uncertainty.  
The aMCC shares extensive reciprocal connections with multiple regions, including the 
amygdala, dlPFC and dmPFC, parietal cortex, and insula, with which it works to sustain these 
five processes and coordinate them in order to diminish uncertainty and facilitate the generation 
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of adaptive behavior in relevant situations (Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Shackman et al., 
2011; Vogt, 2016). Breakdowns in this network’s structures and connecting pathways are likely 
to disrupt effective and efficient processing when circumstances are uncertain. A number of 
distinct functions such as novelty identification, evaluation of reward and error, and the 
anticipation of emotionally salient information in the environment are suggested to converge in 
the aMCC and facilitate response to uncertain situations (Vogt, 2016). This evidence provides 
support for the ideas that the aMCC figures prominently in feedback-mediated decision-making 
and that disruption of proper functioning affects the seamless flow of social decision-making 
when an interacting person is faced with ambiguity. 
 
 
Figure 4 Based on the UAMA (Grupe & Nitschke, 2009), identifying and executing 
adaptive responses are associated with aMCC dysfunction and directly influence the five 
processes of the UAMA. Adapted from “Uncertainty and Anticipation in Anxiety: An Integrated 
Neurobiological and Psychological Perspective” by D. Grupe & J. Nitschke, 2013, Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 14(7), p.488-501, Copyright 2013 by Springer Nature. 
 
1.5.3 aMCC Involvement in the Anticipation of Threat 
A multitude of papers have been published suggesting that brain activity in the aMCC is 
particularly exaggerated during the anticipation of aversive stimuli and circumstances. There is 
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growing evidence, for instance, that the aMCC is activated during sustained anticipatory 
processing when participants are informed that they will be exposed to emotionally aversive 
images as opposed to neutral images (Grupe, Oathes, & Nitschke, 2013; Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, 
Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006). The aMCC’s sensitivity to the expectancy of threat 
has also been observed in response to the anticipation of painful stimuli such as an unpredictable 
electric shock, in variety of contexts (Alvarez, Chen, Bodurka, Kaplan, & Grillon, 2011; 
Carlsson et al., 2006). Furthermore, evidence also indicates that anxious adults and adolescents 
who report diminished perceived cognitive control during the anticipation of aversive threats 
exhibit elevated aMCC activity in comparison to their healthy counterparts (Alvarez et al., 2015). 
Overall, the evidence to date indicates that the aMCC engages routinely in unpredictable 
circumstances, which socially anxious people may find particularly distressing (Boelen & 
Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton et al., 2010; Counsell et al., 2017). 
1.6 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
1.6.1 Justification for the Use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Paradigm to Study Social 
Behavior 
It is difficult to study socio-cognitive processes and their neurobiological correlates in a 
controlled lab setting because of the ambiguity and unpredictability of unstructured social 
interactions. To address these challenges, researchers have turned to interactive economic 
exchange tasks that have the advantage of closely simulating real-life social interactions, while 
also being capable of isolating and quantifying complex social behaviors (King-Casas & Chiu, 
2012; Sanfey, 2007). These tasks consist of simple decision-making scenarios that are structured 
around game theory, a collection of robust models designed to help us understand and explain 
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situations in which decision-makers must interact with or bargain with one another (Neumann, 
1947).  
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) task is an economic exchange game that has been widely 
used to illustrate how people may achieve stable cooperation over the course of multiple 
interactions, even when they implicitly believe it is in their own best interests not to cooperate 
consistently (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982). During this task, players must make 
independent decisions about whether to cooperate or not cooperate (defect) with another player 
in order to win money. The game can be played as a one-round single shot or as an iterated task 
comprising multiple rounds played between the same two players. The payoff for each round of 
the iterated version of the game is maximized for a player who defects when the co-player 
cooperates; the worst outcome occurs when the decisions are reversed. However, if both players 
mutually cooperate over the course of the game they can reach what has been termed “Nash’s 
equilibrium,” in which both players continually make the best response for both parties because 
the alternative is unfavorable (Neyman, 1985; Roth & Murnighan, 1978). This situation benefits 
both players, and a large number of studies utilizing the PD task have focused on comparisons 
between equilibrium responses and self-interested responses (situations in which the player 
attempts to maximize the payoff by defecting for the majority of the task) (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1996; Kreps et al., 1982; Neyman, 1985; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1993). 
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (iPD) task provides a structured context that effectively 
elicits quantifiable patterns of interaction (e.g., displays of pro-social, submissive, hostile or 
competitive behavior) that vary depending on how anxious a player is (McClure et al., 2007; 
Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Taylor, & Lenze, 2016). Each round in the iPD unfolds as a series of 
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phases that mirrors a typical conflict-resolution exchange. First, the participant makes a choice 
(cooperate or defect), then the participant waits in anticipation of the outcome (when the co-
player’s response is revealed), and finally, the participant receives feedback regarding the other 
person’s decision.  
The iPD game is a particularly useful paradigm for studying SA and its correlates for 
several reasons. First, the iPD task requires participants to make repeated predictions about 
others’ behavior and to face painful or rewarding consequences based on their accuracy. Thus, 
for socially anxious people, who commonly lack confidence that they can anticipate or predict 
another person's behavior in a social setting (Whiting, Davis, & Reuther, 2012), this paradigm 
presents a realistic and stressful set of social challenges. Second, behavioral studies that use 
facial-cue processing or self-referential statement paradigms lack ecological validity, in that they 
may not effectively simulate the stressors encountered during a social interaction. Finally, unlike 
many other ecologically valid behavioral tasks, such as stress-provoking conversations with 
confederates or delivery of speeches under scrutiny, the iPD task is compatible with 
neuroimaging, which requires collection of data during multiple events involving salient 
behaviors.  
1.6.2 Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Social Anxiety during iPD Gameplay 
Research has already begun to illustrate how social exchange can activate the brain's 
reward system, how affective factors play an important role in bargaining and competitive 
games, and how the ability to assess another's current and past intentions relates to strategic play 
(Sanfey, 2007; Sripada, Angstadt, Liberzon, McCabe, & Phan, 2013). Recently, a few studies 
have been published that examine how anxiety in particular may influence patterns of behavior, 
emotional response, and brain activity during economic exchange tasks such as the iPD. 
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In one of the first behavioral studies to examine associations between iPD play and 
anxiety, McClure and colleagues (2007) found youths with anxiety disorders, particularly girls, 
to be particularly sensitive to defection and distress in the context of iPD game play. These 
youths nonetheless continue to cooperate, presumably in order to ensure positive affiliation and 
cohesion (McClure et al., 2007). Rodebaugh and colleagues have administered an iPD variant 
(the Flexible Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma) to socially anxious and non-anxious adults and have 
found that those with SAD show a pattern of interpersonal constraint, marked by atypical 
cooperative behavior, particularly if they are also prone to vindictiveness (Rodebaugh et al., 
2013, 2016; Rodebaugh, Klein, Yarkoni, & Langer, 2011).  
To date no published research has examined how SA relates to activity in neural regions 
that support social evaluation under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. In the only fMRI 
study conducted to characterize clinically anxious adolescents' neural, behavioral, and emotional 
responses during the iPD game, researchers found that anxious adolescents showed significant 
elevations in activation in the right TPJ, precuneus, and insula compared to controls in response 
to co-player defection while controls showed greater mPFC/ACC activation than patients 
(McClure-Tone et al., 2011). Groups also differed significantly in post-feedback behavior: 
anxious adolescents were more likely than controls to cooperate following trials when the co- 
player defected. Additionally, during receipt of feedback about co-player defection, anxious 
youth who showed stronger TPJ activity also reported more negative evaluations of the co-
player. 
The present study takes an initial step toward elucidating the neural regions involved in 
various cognitive biases in SA and suggests that ToM regions, such as the TPJ, could show 
distinctive patterns of activation linked to display of these biases. The iPD overall could be an 
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effective paradigm for eliciting neural responses that encompass more than the amygdala 
activation typically seen in SA studies. This study could also provide additional support for the 
assertion that economic-exchange tasks are useful models of social dilemmas and effective tools 
for research aimed at developing functional biomarkers for disorders characterized by 
impairments in interpersonal functioning. 
1.7 Aims of Study 
The literature reviewed thus far provides evidence that ToM reasoning and the generation 
of responses under conditions of uncertainty are each associated with distinct neurobiological 
structures integral to decision-making and navigating social interactions. These regions appear to 
function atypically in both clinical and subclinical SA. Both ToM as a whole and uncertainty 
remain understudied in the context of the iPD paradigm in the population. The iPD is a robust 
and valid research paradigm that is highly effective in simulating social interaction in 
comparison to previous paradigms that did not utilize economic-exchange tasks in a socially-
relevant context. Therefore, the aims of this study are to investigate brain regions involved in 
perspective-taking and response to uncertainty and examine BOLD activity in these regions 
during various periods of the task in subclinical socially anxious adults. A region of interest 
(ROI) will also be defined in the TPJ to calculate BOLD response associated with perspective-
taking and intention attribution. A ROI was defined in the aMCC to calculate BOLD response 
associated with response to uncertainty in the social context. 
Aim 1. The first aim is to compare the BOLD response in a ToM-linked structure 
between people with high and low self-reported SA during the anticipation and feedback phases 
of iPD game trials.  
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Hypothesis 1. High-SA adults will exhibit an elevated BOLD response in the bilateral 
TPJ in comparison to low-SA adults. Furthermore, this difference will be evident during 
anticipation of outcomes of iPD game trials, as well as during feedback regarding trial outcomes 
based on the co-player’s decisions. Additionally, the TPJ response will be more strongly elevated 
in instances of co-player defection, regardless of the participant’s choice.  
Aim 2. The second aim is to compare BOLD response in an uncertainty-linked structure 
between socially anxious participants and healthy controls during the anticipation phase of iPD 
game trials (regardless of whether the player cooperated with or betrayed the other player) 
compared to baseline.  
Hypothesis 2. High-anxious subjects will exhibit an elevated BOLD response in the 
aMCC in comparison to low-anxious participants, regardless of whether the individual 
cooperated or betrayed the co-player. Furthermore, this response will be confined to periods of 
anticipation of the outcome of the trial. 
2 METHODS 
2.1 Procedure 
2.1.1 IRB Approval  
This project focused on fMRI and behavioral data collected during two time periods. The 
first dataset was gathered in 2008; scans were completed on a 3-T magnet at Emory University. 
The second dataset was gathered in 2016-2017 using a 3-T magnet at the Georgia State/Georgia 
Tech Center for Advanced Brain Imaging (CABI). Procedures were approved by the Georgia 
State University, CABI, and Emory University institutional review boards. 
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2.1.2 Participants  
For the 2016/2017 dataset, 20 adults were recruited from the undergraduate psychology 
department student pool of Georgia State University via the SONA online participant recruitment 
system. SONA allows for the prescreening of undergraduate participants through the completion 
of demographic surveys and psychometric measures. Two participants’ data were excluded due 
to excessive motion in the scanner and 1 participant’s age exceeded the previously established 
threshold approved by the IRB, yielding a final sample of 17 subjects. The age range of the 
participants was 18-35 years.  
To determine levels of fear and avoidance in social situations, all participants were 
administered the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report Version (LSAS-SR; Baker, 
Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 2002). Participants in the sample pool who scored at or above the 
75th percentile or higher were identified as high SA. Participants who scored at the 25th 
percentile or lower were identified as low SA/controls. Additionally, answers to the LSAS-SR 
were analyzed to determine the kinds of fears reported by both groups. The high SA group 
tended to report elevated performance-based and interaction-based fears while the low SA group 
reported minimal fears associated with performance and interaction. 
Exclusion criteria, which were screened for during a phone interview, included the 
presence of any metals permanently embedded or implanted in the body, any preexisting major 
medical conditions, any major psychiatric disorders, and current use of any psychotropic 
medication.  
For the 2008 dataset, 19 subjects were recruited from the undergraduate psychology 
department student pool of Georgia State University via the SONA online participant recruitment 
system. Participants were selected from a larger pool of students who had completed the LSAS-
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SR. Individuals who reported high levels of SA or low levels of SA (defined identically as in the 
2016/2017 sample) were contacted via telephone by researchers and invited to participate in the 
MRI study at the Center for MR Research at Emory University. Four participants’ data were 
excluded from analysis due to excessive head motion and 1 participant was removed from the 
scanner due to general discomfort, leaving data from 14 subjects, aged 18-35 years, available for 
analysis. Overall, between datasets, 25 females and 6 males were recruited for the study, with a 
mean age of 20.6 years (SD=3.5 years). 
Individuals older than 50 years were excluded from the study due to potential changes in 
brain metabolism that may be associated with aging (Angelie et al., 2001). Additional exclusion 
criteria included presence of any metals permanently embedded or implanted in the body, 
pregnancy or the use of contraceptives 48 hours prior to the MRI scan time, the presence of an 
identifiable Central Nervous System (CNS) disorder or a history of loss of consciousness due to 
a traumatic brain injury, and the presence of a visual or hearing disability that would prevent the 
participant from seeing and hearing the stimuli in the scanner. 
2.1.3 Anxiety Measures 
Severity of SA symptoms was assessed using the LSAS-SR. This short questionnaire is 
designed to assess the range of social interaction and performance situations feared by a patient 
in order to assist in the diagnosis of SAD consistent with the criteria established by the DSM-V. 
The scale’s items each describe one of 24 social situations, 13 of which relate to performance 
anxiety and 11 of which concern social situations. For each of the 24 social situations, 
participants first rate on a Likert scale from 0 to 3 how much fear or apprehension they feel: 0) 
none, 1) mild, 2) moderate, and 3) severe. They then rate how likely they are to avoid each social 
situation: 0) never, 1) occasionally, 2) often, and 3) usually. Combining the total scores of the 
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Fear and Avoidance sub-sections of the questionnaire yields an overall score with a maximum of 
144 possible points.  
Heimberg et al. (1992) found that scores on an interviewer-administered version of the 
LSAS were significantly correlated with scores on the Social Phobia Scale, an observer measure 
of social phobic symptoms referred to as the Brief Social Phobia Scale, (Davidson et al., 1991) 
and the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) . In another study (Heimberg 
et al., 1999), LSAS scores correlated strongly with scores on other scales, including the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression, Beck’s Depression Inventory and the Hamilton Anxiety Rating 
Scale. Scores on the LSAS and its subscales were normally distributed and demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency and convergent validity in this study. 
 This scale has been validated as a self-report measure (Fresco et al., 2001) and is often 
supplemented with the Structural Clinical Interview for DSM in a clinical setting (Rytwinski, 
2009). Fresco and colleagues (2001) compared the clinician-administered and self-report 
measure of the LSAS and failed to find any significant differences on any scale or subscale 
score. Both forms were internally consistent and the subscale intercorrelations for the two forms 
were fundamentally identical. Correlations of each LSAS-SR index with its complement, the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale–Children and Adults were all significant. Finally, the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the two forms of the LSAS was shown to be robust. The LSAS-SR 
thus appears to be an accurate and cost-effective way to identify and sub-type subjects with SAD 
and subclinical SA. 
2.2 Task Description 
In both datasets, in each 20-trial iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Rilling, 
Gutman, Zeh, Pagnoni, Berns, & Kilts, 2002), trials proceeded as shown in Figure 5; the 
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participant chose to cooperate or betray, and then waited for a “co-player”, who independently 
decided to cooperate or to betray (defect). The participant and co-player were equally rewarded 
($2) if both cooperated; if one player betrayed but the other cooperated, the betraying player 
received a reward ($3) and the cooperating player received nothing ($0). If both chose to betray, 
both received only a small reward ($1).  Each participant played three PD games in a randomized 
order—in two, they were deceived to believe that they were playing with a confederate (but 
actually played a computer algorithm) and in one they were told that they were playing the 
computer.  
Participants had six seconds to make a decision during each trial; thus, there was 
variability in reaction times for each participant. The decision was followed by a 3, 6, or 9 
second jittered interstimulus interval (ISI). After the jitter period, feedback regarding the trial 
outcome was presented for six seconds.  
The 20-trial game was split into 5-trial blocks, with an additional blank trial included in 
each block. After every five trials, the participant was given as much time as needed to answer 
each of four emotional assessment questions before beginning the next 5-trial block. After the 
last 5-trial block of the 20-trial game, the participant answered four emotional assessment 
questions and then viewed both players’ total earnings for the game. After 12-20 seconds, 
participants then answered ten additional emotional assessment questions. Each game proceeded 
in this fashion. Participants were paid an average of the amount that they earned over the three 
games. If viewed as a series of interpersonal interactions, the Prisoner's Dilemma can provide a 
measure of willingness to work together or to work for one's own self-interest by counting the 
number of times a participant cooperates or defects while playing the game (Axelrod, 1980). 
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Decision          Anticipation   Feedback 
   
Figure 5 An example of a mutual cooperation trial (CC) of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each 
trial can be separated into a decision, anticipation, and feedback phase. 
 
2.3 Experimental Design 
Following consent, an examiner informed participants that they would play a game with 
other study participants via a wireless computer network. The examiner provided no further 
information about the co-player and deferred responses to all questions about the co-player until 
the end of the task. Participants then underwent training on the game and completed practice 
rounds in a mock scanner. During each of the rounds that constitute a game, two players (the 
participant and a computerized co-player) independently and simultaneously chose to cooperate 
with or “defect from” (not cooperate with) the other player. The participant indicated his or her 
choice via trigger press (left=“cooperate”, right=“not cooperate”). After both players submitted 
their choices, the outcome of the round appeared on the screen, along with a running total of 
each player’s cumulative earnings for a game. Periodically during the game and after the game, 
participants were asked (via the computer screen) about their perceptions of and predictions 
about their co-player's intentions and goals, as well as about their own emotional responses 
during play and their levels of confidence in their predictions.  
Subsequently, in accordance with guidelines for ethically appropriate authorized 
deception, participants were debriefed about the deception involved in the task and the 
motivation for its use. They were informed at consent that during the study protocol they would 
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be given misleading or inaccurate information, but they were not told when this would occur. 
During post-game debriefing, a research assistant read each participant a standardized statement 
that described how they had been deceived and explained that deception was necessary to ensure 
that they experienced the game as a “real” interaction with another person. After the researcher 
explained the deception process and rationale, participants were asked if they had believed the 
deception and encouraged to express any concerns that they had about being deceived. No 
participants expressed concerns and all participant data was retained for further analysis. 
2.4 Scanning 
2.4.1 2008 Data 
The 2008 dataset was collected using a Siemens TIM Trio 3-T MRI scanner equipped 
with a 12-channel head coil. E-Prime 1.1 was used to present task stimuli (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc.). Participants recorded decisions to cooperate or defect using a hand-held, 4-button 
response box.  
A localizer and a manual shim procedure preceded each functional scan. Functional task-
related BOLD signal data was acquired with a ZSAGA functional protocol, a method for 
reducing the influence of magnetic susceptibility artifacts in echo planar imaging (Heberlein & 
Hu, 2004) (number of volumes vary depending on time spent on task; TR = 3,000 ms; TE 1 = 30 
ms; TE 2=65.8 ms; matrix size = 64 x 64 mm; FA =90°; 3.3 x 3.3x 3.3 mm3 voxels; 30 
interleaved slices; FOV = 210 mm).  A high resolution anatomical image was also  acquired 
using a T1-weighted standardized magnetization gradient echo sequence to aid spatial 
normalization (MPRAGE; sagittal plane; TR =2300 ms; TE=3.02 ms; matrix size of 256x256 
mm, 1 mm3 isomorphic voxels, 176 interleaved slices; FOV = 256 mm; flip angle 8°). 
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2.4.2 2016/2017 Data 
The 2016 dataset was collected at the Center for Advanced Brain Imaging (CABI), which 
houses a Siemens TIM Trio 3T MRI scanner equipped with a 12-channel head coil for rapid 
parallel imaging of the brain. The E-Prime 2.0 platform was used to present task stimuli 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). The procedure used to display tasks stimuli and allow 
participants to make decisions on the stimuli was consistent with the Emory protocol.  
A localizer and a manual shim procedure preceded each functional scan. A 40 minute 
functional task-related BOLD scan was acquired with a T2*-weighted echo-planar functional 
protocol (number of volumes vary depending time spent on task; TR = 2,000 ms; TE = 30 ms; 
matrix size = 64 x 64 mm; FA =77°; 3.4 x 3.4x 4.0 mm3 voxels; 33 interleaved slices; FOV = 
220 mm).  A high resolution anatomical image was also  acquired using a T1-weighted 
standardized magnetization spoiled gradient echo sequence to aid spatial normalization 
(MPRAGE; sagittal plane; TR =2250 ms; TE=4.18 ms;  GRAPPA parallel imaging factor of 2; a 
matrix resolution size of 256x256 mm, 1 mm3 isomorphic voxels, 176 interleaved slices; FOV = 
256 mm; FA=9°). 
2.5 Preprocessing 
For the 2008 dataset, preprocessing was completed using SPM12. Functional data were 
corrected for slice timing and motion, realigned and registered to the mean image, spatially 
normalized to the MNI template of SPM and resliced into isotropic 2mm voxels, and smoothed 
using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. For the 2016 dataset, using DPARSF software, 
functional data were corrected for slice timing and motion, co-registered to the anatomical data, 
and realigned and registered to the mean image. The images collected in 2016 needed to be 
resized to match the scale and dimensions of the 2008 dataset. After resizing was completed, the 
31 
data were spatially normalized to the MNI template of SPM and resliced into isotropic 2mm 
voxels, and smoothed using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. After completing these 
preprocessing steps, the quality of the co-registration procedure was evaluated by visually 
inspecting the fMRI images for any inconsistencies. 
2.6 Analysis 
2.6.1 Behavioral Analysis 
Three independent chi-square tests were used to compare decision-making behavior 
between the high anxiety and low anxiety groups. This analysis was conducted to provide 
descriptive information about participants’ tendency to cooperate or defect overall, tendency to 
cooperate or defect after co-player cooperation, and tendency to cooperate or defect after co-
player defection. 
 
 
2.6.2 Event-Related Regressors based on PD Paradigm 
To analyze the fMRI data, general linear modelling was conducted using SPM12 to 
estimate event-related average BOLD response amplitudes across predefined regions of interest 
(ROI) at the individual subject level and the group level. Secondary exploratory analyses were 
conducted after testing the original hypotheses. 
Primary event-related regressors were comprised of four regressors for the feedback 
component of each event type of interest and two regressors for the anticipation component. The 
four feedback regressors comprised a CC condition (mutual cooperation--both players 
cooperated); a CD condition (unreciprocated response--the subject cooperated while the co-
player defected); a DC condition (another type of unreciprocated response--the subject defected 
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while the co-player cooperated); and a DD condition (mutual defection). The 2 anticipation 
regressors were specified according to whether the participant cooperated or defected. 
 Additionally, to account for other activity that could confound results, regressors were 
specified for the decision portion of the task, as well as for periods during which subjects 
answered emotional assessment questions. Two regressors accounted for whether a decision was 
made to cooperate or defect, and one regressor accounted for the emotional assessment 
questions. Furthermore, because we wanted to account for the fact that two out of the three 
games were played against a “human” and one game was played against a computer, all 
regressors  distinguished between trials played against human or computer, doubling the total 
number of regressors to 18 for each individual subject. Finally, a framewise displacement 
regressor was included in the single subject analyses as an additional motion regressor.  In the 
group-level analysis, the site at which data were collected was included as a covariate. 
Overall, comparisons examined differences in activity within the TPJ and aMCC between 
high and low anxiety groups during different feedback conditions (e.g., CD+DD trials versus CC 
+ DC trials). 
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Figure 6 Sample design matrix of 18 condition task (Each column represents a condition 
of interest associated with the task that was included in the complete statistical model of 
analysis) 
 
2.6.3 Neuroimaging: Region of Interest Analysis  
Regions of interest (ROIs) were defined for the TPJ and the aMCC using PickAtlas 
(Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003).  The ROI for the TPJ was generated based on the 
approach that McClure-Tone et al. (2011) used. This ROI consisted of a sphere with a radius of 
15 mm, centered at coordinates 48, −54, 27. The ROI for the aMCC was generated based on the 
method that Grupe et al. (2013) used in a paper examining dissociable networks that process the 
anticipation of aversion. The peak voxel was centered at coordinates 3, 7, 33 with a radius of 
10mm (Grupe, Oathes, & Nitschke, 2013). Because the aMCC is a large region, the radius was 
expanded to 15mm to more effectively capture activity comprehensively across the region.   
Once the masks for the two ROIs were designed, the anticipation contrasts specified in 
SPM were anticipation after cooperation (C), anticipation after defection (D), and anticipation 
regardless of decision (C+D). The feedback contrasts specified were mutual cooperation (CC), 
unreciprocated cooperation (CD), unreciprocated defection (DC), and mutual defection (DD). To 
examine general responses to co-player cooperation, the CC and DC trials were combined (co-
player Cooperation); to examine general responses to co-player defection the CD and DD trials 
were combined (co-player Defection). 
Hypothesis 1. To test the first hypothesis, we conducted one-sample t-tests to contrast 
BOLD activity during general anticipation (C+D) and the two feedback conditions 
(CC+DC/CD+DD) against baseline for each individual subject. The TPJ mask was applied 
individually after specifying each contrast, and the p-value was set at an uncorrected threshold of 
.05. The average weighted mean of the BOLD signal within the ROI was extracted as the 
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principal eigenvariate value (PEV). The PEV summarizes group data across voxels, yielding a 
singular value decomposition (SVD) of the time series. This strategy is optimal for interpreting 
condition-related response amplitudes without assuming homogenous responses within the ROI 
(Friston, Rothstein, Geng, Sterzer, & Henson, 2006).  
Additionally, to test the hypothesis that activity during feedback regarding defection 
would be significantly greater than activity during feedback regarding cooperation, t-tests were 
conducted contrasting BOLD activity during feedback about defection (CD+DD) with activity 
during feedback regarding cooperation from the co-player (CC+DC). The PEVs across the ROI 
were then compared in a pair of group analyses modelled using a 2x2 mixed design ANOVA in 
SPSS. In the first analysis, anxiety group was included as the between groups variable 
(High/low) and feedback was included as the within-subjects variable (co-player 
cooperation/defection). In the second analysis, anticipation of co-player response following 
player choice was included as the within-subjects variable (anticipation following the decision to 
cooperate versus anticipation following the decision to defect).  
The frequency of each trial type varied markedly across participants, with some 
generating equivalent numbers of each type and others generating no trials of a particular type 
(e.g., a participant defects for a whole game, and consequently no CC or CD trials occur for that 
individual). This affected our study’s power; thus, to facilitate discussion and to inform future 
hypothesis generation, given the limited research in this area, we elected to report, but not to 
interpret, findings that were significant at uncorrected thresholds of p < .01 and p < .05.   
Hypothesis 2. To test the second hypothesis, we followed the procedures specified for 
Hypothesis 1; the only difference was that we used the aMCC mask instead of the TPJ mask.  
35 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 Behavioral Analysis 
A Pearson chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the tendencies of 
high and low anxiety subjects to cooperate or defect. Results indicated that the relationship 
between these variables was statistically significant, χ2 (3, N=3122) = 23.355, p < .001. 
Although rates of cooperation were similar across groups, high anxiety subjects were more likely 
to defect than were low anxiety subjects.  
We conducted a second Pearson chi-square test of independence to examine the 
association between high/low anxiety group membership and tendency to cooperate or defect 
after co-player cooperation. The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2 (1, 
N=667) = 10.918, p < .001. Low anxiety subjects were more likely to cooperate after co-player 
cooperation in comparison to high anxiety subjects. High anxiety subjects were more likely to 
defect after co-player defection in comparison to low anxiety subjects. 
A final Pearson chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the tendency 
of high and low anxiety subjects to cooperate or defect after co-player defection. There was no 
significant relationship between these variables, χ2 (1, N=574) = 1.627, p = .202. 
3.2 Neuroimaging Results 
3.2.1 TPJ Activation during Co-Player Feedback 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare TPJ response during receipt of 
feedback about co-player cooperation between high and low anxiety subjects. BOLD response in 
the TPJ did not differ significantly between high (M = 1.33, SD = 1.48) and low anxiety groups 
(M = 1.31, SD = 0.88) in response to co-player cooperation, t(29) = -0.04, p = .97. A separate 
independent samples t-test also showed a non-significant difference between high (M = 1.93, SD 
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= 1.55) and low anxiety groups (M = 1.68, SD = 1.17) in response to co-player defection, t(29) = 
-0.50, p = .62. 
We then conducted a 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA to compare BOLD response within the TPJ 
during feedback about co-player cooperation and feedback about co-player defection between 
high and low anxiety groups (see Figure 7). For this and all subsequent mixed ANCOVAs, 
anxiety group (high, low) was included as a between-subjects factor and site of collection 
(CABI, Emory) was included as a covariate. A main effects analysis revealed that co-player 
feedback did not significantly predict BOLD response in the TPJ, F(1,28) = 2.80, p = .11. The 
interaction between anxiety group and feedback condition also did not significantly predict 
BOLD activity in the TPJ, F(1,28) = 0.34, p = .57. 
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Table 1 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences in response to co-player 
feedback in the TPJ 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Feedback 1 2.01 2.80 .11 
Feedback x Site 1 .70 .97 .33 
Feedback x 
Anxiety Level 
1 .24 .34 .57 
Error 28 .72   
 
 
Figure 7 Mean BOLD response in the TPJ during processing of co-player feedback 
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3.2.2 TPJ Activation during Anticipation of Outcome 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the BOLD response within the 
TPJ during the periods of anticipation following the decision to cooperate and anticipation 
following the decision to defect between high and low anxiety subjects. High anxiety subjects 
(M = 0.85, SD = 1.18) and low anxiety subjects (M = 0.64, SD = 0.82) exhibited similar BOLD 
responses in the TPJ when anticipating outcomes following their own decision to cooperate 
t(1,29) = -0.58, p = .57. No significant differences in BOLD activity elicited during anticipation 
following the decision to defect were evident between high anxiety (M = .94, SD = 1.26) and 
low anxiety subjects (M = 0.75, SD = 0.78), t(1,29) = -0.48, p = .64. 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was conducted to compare BOLD response within the TPJ 
during anticipation following cooperation and during anticipation following defection between 
high and low anxiety subjects. A main effects analysis revealed that anticipation of outcome did 
not significantly predict BOLD response in the TPJ, F(1,28) = .19, p = .67. The interaction 
between anxiety group and anticipation condition also did not significantly predict activation in 
the TPJ, F(1,28) = 0.002, p = .97.  
 
Table 2 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences of anticipatory processing in 
the TPJ 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Anticipation 1 .13 .19 .67 
Anticipation x Site 1 .06 .09 .77 
Anticipation x 
Anxiety Level 
1 .001 .002 .97 
Error 28 .69   
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3.2.3 aMCC Activity during Co-Player Feedback 
An independent samples t-test comparing aMCC response to co-player cooperation 
between high and low anxiety subjects did not yield evidence of significant differences between 
high anxiety subjects (M = 1.33, SD = 1.48) and low anxious individuals (M = 1.31, SD = 0.88), 
t(1,29) = -0.24, p = .81. An independent samples t-test comparing aMCC response to co-player 
defection between high anxiety (M = 1.93, SD = 1.55) and low anxiety subjects (M = 1.68, SD = 
1.17) also yielded non-significant results, t(1,29) = -0.5, p = .62. 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was conducted to compare BOLD response in the aMCC 
during feedback about co-player cooperation and feedback about co-player defection in both 
high and low anxiety subjects. The main effects analysis revealed that co-player feedback did 
significantly predict BOLD activity within the aMCC, F(1,28) = 4.93, p < .05. aMCC activity 
was more elevated during the processing of co-player defection in comparison to co-player 
cooperation. However, the interaction between anxiety group and feedback condition did not 
significantly predict BOLD activity in the aMCC, F(1,28) = 0.15, p = .71. 
 
Table 3 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences in response to co-player 
feedback in the aMCC 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Feedback 1 2.64 4.93 .04* 
Feedback x Site 1 2.08 3.88 .06 
Feedback x 
Anxiety Level 
1 .08 .15 .71 
Error 28 .54   
  
40 
3.2.4 aMCC Activation during Anticipation of Outcome 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare BOLD activation in the aMCC 
between high and low anxiety subjects during both anticipation of co-player response following 
the participant’s decision to cooperate and anticipation of co-player response following the 
participant’s decision to defect. BOLD responses did not differ significantly between high 
anxiety subjects (M = 0.81, SD = 0.66) and low anxiety subjects (M = 0.58, SD = 0.90) when 
they were anticipating outcomes following their own decisions to cooperate t(1,29) = -0.81, p = 
.42. BOLD activity was also similar between high anxiety (M = 0.99, SD = 1.46) and low 
anxiety subjects (M = 0.90, SD = 1.05) during anticipation following their own decisions to 
defect, t(1,29) = -0.20, p = .84. 
We conducted 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVAs to compare BOLD responses within the aMCC 
between high and low anxiety subjects during both anticipation following cooperation and 
anticipation following defection. The main effects analysis revealed that anticipation of outcome 
did not predict significant BOLD response in the aMCC, F(1,28) = 2.06, p =.16. Anxiety group 
and anticipation condition did not interact to significantly predict activity in the TPJ, F(1,28) = 
0.09, p = .77. 
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Table 4 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences in anticipatory processing in the 
aMCC 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Anticipation 1 1.28 2.06 .16 
Anticipation x Site 1 .74 1.19 .28 
Anticipation x 
Anxiety Level 
1 .05 .09 .77 
Error 28 .62   
 
 
Figure 8 Mean BOLD Response in the aMCC during the anticipation of outcome 
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3.3 Exploratory Analyses 
3.3.1 TPJ Activation during Reciprocated and Unreciprocated Feedback 
Due to the lack of consensus within iPD literature concerning how outcome trials should 
be arranged and analyzed, we decided to run post-hoc tests examining group differences in both 
ROIs during periods in which participants received reciprocated (CC+DD) and unreciprocated 
(CD+DC) feedback. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare TPJ response 
during receipt of reciprocated feedback between high and low anxiety subjects. BOLD response 
in the TPJ did not differ significantly between the high (M = 1.43, SD = 1.29) and low (M = 
1.60, SD = 1.17) anxiety subjects in response to reciprocated feedback, t(29) = .37, p = .71. A 
separate independent samples t-test also showed a non-significant difference between high (M = 
2.03, SD = 1.55) and low (M = 1.39, SD = .95) anxiety groups in response to unreciprocated 
feedback, t(29) = -1.35, p = .19. 
We conducted a 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA to compare BOLD response within the TPJ 
during reciprocated feedback and unreciprocated feedback between high and low anxiety 
subjects (see Figure 9). A main effects analysis showed that feedback did not significantly 
predict BOLD response in the TPJ, F(1,28) = 0.66, p = .42. However, the interaction between 
anxiety group and feedback condition did significantly predict BOLD activity in the TPJ, F(1,28) 
= 4.35, p <.05. While both groups exhibited a similar BOLD response during the processing of 
reciprocated feedback, high anxiety subjects exhibited significantly greater BOLD response 
during the processing of unreciprocated feedback in comparison to low anxiety subjects. 
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Table 5 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences in response to reciprocated & 
unreciprocated feedback in the TPJ 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Feedback 1 .36 .66 .42 
Feedback x Site 1 .79 1.45 .24 
Feedback x 
Anxiety Level 
1 2.38 4.35 .05* 
Error 28 .55   
 
 
 
Figure 9 Mean BOLD response in TPJ during processing of reciprocated and 
unreciprocated feedback 
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3.3.2 aMCC Activation during Reciprocated and Unreciprocated Feedback 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare aMCC response during 
reciprocated feedback between high and low anxiety subjects. BOLD response in the aMCC did 
not differ significantly between high (M = 1.11, SD = 1.12) and low anxiety individuals (M = 
1.34, SD = 0.95) during processing of reciprocated feedback, t(29) = .60, p = .56. A separate 
independent samples t-test also showed a non-significant difference between high (M = 1.84, SD 
= 1.43) and low anxiety groups (M = 1.16, SD = 1.00) during processing of unreciprocated 
feedback, t(29) = -1.52, p = .14. 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was conducted to compare BOLD response within the aMCC 
during feedback about co-player cooperation and feedback about co-player defection between 
high and low anxiety subjects (see Figure 10). A main effects analysis showed that feedback did 
not significantly predict BOLD response in the aMCC, F(1,28) = 2.80, p = .11. However, the 
interaction between anxiety group and feedback condition did significantly predict BOLD 
activity in the aMCC, F(1,28) = 0.34, p = .57. While BOLD response to reciprocated feedback 
was similar between groups, aMCC was significantly elevated in high anxiety comparison to low 
anxiety subjects when processing unreciprocated feedback. 
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Table 6 Mixed ANCOVA results for examining differences in response to reciprocated & 
unreciprocated feedback in the aMCC 
 
Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
Feedback 1 .006 .01 .91 
Feedback x Site 1 .09 .20 .66 
Feedback*Anxiety 
Level 
1 3.15 7.28 .01** 
Error 28 .43   
 
 
 
Figure 10 Mean BOLD response in the aMCC during the processing of reciprocated and 
unreciprocated feedback 
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3.3.3  Effect of Site on aMCC activity during Co-player Feedback 
The mixed ANCOVA examining group differences in the aMCC during co-player 
cooperation and defection revealed an interaction that was on the verge of significance between 
feedback and site of collection, F(1,29) = 3.88, p = .06 (see Table 3). To tease apart the nature of 
this relationship, we conducted a post-hoc mixed ANOVA including site as the between-subjects 
factor predicting response to co-player feedback. There was a significant difference in BOLD 
response between sites at CABI, F(1,29) = 71.86, p <  .001 and at Emory, F(1,29) = 9.42, p < 
.01. BOLD response was significantly more elevated at the CABI site compared to the Emory 
site. Additionally, there was almost a significant within-subjects effect of site at the CABI site, 
F(1,29) = 3.95, p = .06. There was no significant within-subjects effect of site at Emory, F(1,29) 
= .65, p = .43. 
 
Table 7 Mixed ANOVA results for examining site differences in response to co-player feedback 
in the aMCC 
 
Test of Between-Subject Effects 
 
Site Source Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
CABI Intercept 1 129.27 71.86 .000** 
Error 16 1.80   
Emory Intercept  1 10.16 9.42 .009** 
Error 13 1.08   
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Test of Within-Subject Effects 
Site Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
CABI Feedback 1 2.48 3.95 .06 
Error 16 .63   
Emory Feedback 1 .25 .65 .43 
Error 13 .39   
 
 
 
Figure 11 Site-by-site comparison of mean BOLD response in aMCC while processing 
co-player feedback 
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3.3.4 Effect of Site on TPJ activity during Co-player Feedback 
We also conducted a post-hoc mixed ANOVA including site as the between-subjects 
factor predicting response to co-player feedback in the TPJ. There was a significant difference in 
BOLD response between sites at CABI, F(1,29) = 55.52, p <  .001 and at Emory, F(1,29) = 
20.40, p < .001. BOLD response was significantly more elevated at the CABI site compared to 
the Emory site. Additionally, there was a significant within-subjects effect of site at the CABI 
site, F(1,29) = 5.02, p < .05. There was no significant within-subjects effect of site at Emory, 
F(1,29) = .93, p = .35. BOLD response was significantly greater while processing co-player 
defection in comparison to co-player cooperation at the CABI site, but not the Emory site of 
collection. 
 
Table 8 Mixed ANOVA results for examining site differences in response to co-player feedback 
in the TPJ 
 
Test of Between-Subjects Effects  
 
Site Source Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
CABI Intercept 1 152.43 55.52 .000** 
Error 16 2.75   
Emory Intercept  1 23.03 20.40 .001** 
Error 13 1.13   
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Test of Within-Subjects Effects 
Site Variables of 
Interest 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig 
CABI Feedback 1 4.07 5.02 .04* 
Error 16 .81   
Emory Feedback 1 .53 .93 .35 
Error 13 .57   
 
 
 
Figure 12 Site-by-site comparison of BOLD response in TPJ while processing co-player 
feedback 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Discussion 
The objective of this thesis was to identify neural regions that mediate the maladaptive 
cognitive biases that individuals with SA exhibit during interpersonal interactions. Our findings, 
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in a sample of college students who self-reported high or low levels of SA, contradicted our 
hypotheses regarding group differences in neural response during processing of feedback about 
co-player behavior.  Results were also inconsistent with our predictions about brain activity 
during periods of anticipation and uncertainty regarding outcomes of decisions made during task 
play.  
We had predicted that there would be group differences in BOLD activity in the TPJ 
during anticipation of outcome and feedback appraisal while group differences in the aMCC 
would only be exhibited during anticipation of outcome. However, BOLD activity in the TPJ and 
aMCC did not differ between high and low SA individuals during appraisal of co-player 
cooperation or during appraisal of co-player defection. Furthermore, no significant group 
differences in BOLD activity in either ROI were apparent during anticipation of outcomes of any 
type. These findings provide evidence that key neural regions that mediate the processing of 
social interaction do not exhibit functional differences between subclinical SA and healthy 
populations.  
One potential reason for our failure to detect significant group differences in activation 
within the ROIs is that we restricted our focus to participants whose SA symptoms were of mild 
to moderate severity and who had not been formally diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. 
Interpreted through this lens, the results suggest that abnormal brain activity attributed to clinical 
samples did not appear in our subclinical sample, which introduces a number of possibilities. 
One is that with the assessment instruments available to us now, anxious symptoms must pass a 
specific threshold of severity for brain activity to be noticeably atypical. Evidence from a small 
body of fMRI research suggests that there may be noticeable differences in brain activity 
between subclinically and clinically anxious individuals during tasks that involve processing 
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emotional facial expressions (Carré et al., 2014; Duval et al., 2013) and self-referential/anxiety-
relevant information (Abraham et al., 2013). It may thus be that participants in our study did not 
exceed a critical threshold of anxiety, at which distinctive patterns of brain activity would be 
evident.  
Alternatively, the various types of social feedback generated in the iPD paradigm may be 
ineffective at evoking the noticeable and robust emotional and neural responses required to 
differentiate between healthy and subclinical levels of neuropsychiatric symptoms. However, 
many findings in the PD fMRI literature to date suggest that this possibility is unlikely. iPD 
fMRI studies that have used subclinical samples recruited from university campuses have 
repeatedly yielded evidence of significant neural differences between young adults with 
subclinical symptoms of various types and symptom-free peers (Chen et al., 2016; Gervais, 
Kline, Ludmer, George, & Manson, 2013; Gradin et al., 2016; Rilling et al., 2007; Schneider-
Hassloff et al., 2016). Nevertheless, it is important to note that only one of these studies recruited 
a subclinical anxious sample (Chen et al., 2016). Additionally, previous fMRI subclinical SA 
research only implicated regions involved in affective processing and emotional regulation (K. S. 
Blair et al., 2011; Carré et al., 2014; Duval et al., 2013). Future research must be conducted to 
further elucidate how subclinical SA groups differ from healthy populations using economic-
exchange tasks. 
 Additionally, there is some evidence that performance-based social fears reflect milder 
manifestations of SA than do interaction-based fears (Crome & Baillie, 2014). It is possible that 
individuals who exhibit mild, subclinical symptoms are less likely than more anxious peers to be 
distressed by one-on-one social interactions like those in the iPD task. However, participants in 
our study who endorsed high levels of SA reported, on average, both significant interaction fears 
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and performance fears. These observations generate questions about the degree to which these 
self-reported fears correlate with neural dysfunction within the subclinical population. 
Understanding the nature of the underlying fears associated with different degrees of severity in 
SA would facilitate understanding of the neural structure of the various dimensions of the 
disorder.   
Another important factor to consider is that the type of social feedback being processed 
can be critical to determining the resulting neural response. The subclinical group exhibited a 
significant elevation in BOLD signal in comparison to controls when contrasting unreciprocated 
and reciprocated feedback, results which contradicted the null findings produced when analyzing 
feedback to partner choice. A strong consensus does not exist within the PD fMRI literature 
about whether researchers should organize contrasts to focus on comparing social feedback trials 
based on reciprocated/unreciprocated response (Gradin et al., 2016; Rilling et al., 2002) or 
partner choice (McClure-Tone et al., 2011; Rilling et al., 2007; Suzuki, Niki, Fujisaki, & 
Akiyama, 2011). Furthermore, researchers typically do not provide justification for how they 
group their feedback contrasts for statistical analysis. We contend that responses to co-player 
cooperation and defection are a function of monetary feedback (cooperationmax reward, 
defectiondiminished), while responses to reciprocated and unreciprocated feedback are a 
function of social feedback (reciprocatedcongruent, unreciprocatedincongruent). Congruent 
in this case signifies outcomes that are fair and meet social expectations. Incongruent signifies 
outcomes that are unfair, fail to meet social expectations, and introduce conflict into the 
interaction. Future work should address whether there are distinct differences in the processing 
of situational contexts in various forms of anticipation and feedback in SA (e.g. monetary vs. 
social) and determine whether this affects how they approach developing strategies of iPD task 
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play. Neuroimaging paradigms utilizing this “monetary vs. social context” framework have 
already been applied to both neurotypical (Rademacher et al., 2010; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009) 
and neuropsychiatric (Delmonte et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Gadea et al., 2016) populations, 
providing a solid foundation for these questions to be addressed. 
An aspect of our study to consider is that the failure to detect significant group 
differences in BOLD activity during feedback following defection versus cooperation in either 
the TPJ or the aMCC is partially inconsistent with findings from an earlier study with a similar 
methodological framework that was used to model our own experiment (McClure-Tone et al., 
2011). This earlier study compared neural activity during iPD game play between adolescents 
diagnosed with a range of anxiety and mood disorders (e.g. GAD, SAD, and MDD) and 
diagnosis-free controls. In their study, which focused exclusively on brain activity during the 
processing of feedback during co-player defection versus cooperation, McClure-Tone and 
colleagues found evidence of elevated BOLD activity in the TPJ, precuneus, and insula (relative 
to baseline) in patients, relative to controls.  
These inconsistent findings could at least partially stem from a number of methodological 
differences between the two studies. First, McClure-Tone et al. (2011) presented data from a 
smaller sample (N = 29; n = 12 anxious and n = 17 controls) than that recruited for the present 
study. Moreover, McClure-Tone et al.’s sample included adolescents with a variety of anxiety 
and mood disorders (only 3 met criteria for SAD). Finally, the earlier study presented results at a 
liberal uncorrected statistical threshold of p < .05, which increases the possibility that chance 
findings were inaccurately identified as significant.  
Finally, the issue of multicenter collection also warrants attention when interpreting the 
results of our study. The data collected at Emory were acquired using a ZSAGA MR sequence 
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that was designed to account for the negative influence magnetic susceptibility artifacts have on 
the ability to detect signal in certain regions of the brain (Heberlein & Hu, 2004). However, a 
post hoc analysis revealed that when site was included as a between-subjects variable, across all 
events of interest, the eigenvalues were persistently diminished in the Emory data in comparison 
to the eigenvalues extracted from CABI subjects. Despite these lingering concerns about the 
influence of site on the quality of data collected, it is important to note that site was included as a 
covariate in our mixed ANCOVA statistical designs with the results revealing that site did not 
significantly account for variance within the current analyses, although one interaction was close 
to approaching significance (see Table 3). 
4.2 Limitations 
There are a few limitations of this study.  Some relate to our study design and 
methodology. First, our study was underpowered in comparison to past studies that used similar 
methodology. Second, we collected our data at two independent sites, with several years 
separating time of collection. Diverging scanner protocols were utilized to collect the data; we 
thus needed to correct some of the data for these differences during preprocessing to ensure that 
parameters were consistent. In an effort to minimize the effects of any remaining differences, we 
also included site as a regressor in all analyses and, in preliminary analyses, we compared the 
two datasets directly and found evidence of similar patterns of activation between them. 
However, as stated earlier in the discussion, it is apparent that data collected at Emory still 
affected our overall analysis. 
Other limitations have to do with participant biases affecting gameplay strategy. For 
example, a number of participants used strategies that favored defection over cooperation, which 
limited the number of CD trials that could be sampled from those subjects. These contrast images 
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were still included in the subsequent group analysis and possibly reduced the overall power of 
the analysis by introducing noise associated with the lack of variability in those trials. Another 
limitation is that the complexities of real-life social interactions cannot fully be captured 
currently with the paradigms currently available to social neuroscientists. Differences in how 
participants anticipate and appraise social feedback could reflect processes that are insensitive to 
the parameters established by the task. 
4.3 Future Directions 
Despite these limitations, the present study makes a contribution to the literature by 
generating new knowledge about the neural underpinnings of subclinical SA. Advances in social 
neuroscience are anticipated with the hope that further progress will be made in the isolation of 
the neural correlates of abnormal social and behavioral experience in psychiatric disorders.  
The importance of categorization of social feedback is the most critical takeaway from 
the results of the current study. Future studies using the iPD paradigm should prioritize analyzing 
neural activity associated with both partner choice (monetary context) and reciprocation (social 
context) instead of selecting one form of context without justification. This analysis should be 
supplemented with a debriefing questionnaire that rates whether the participants were more 
concerned with monetary reward or the maintenance of the relationship while playing the task. 
This step would be critical in reinforcing the iPD paradigm as a model of social dilemma and 
supplement current literature that employs “monetary vs. social context” paradigms (Delmonte et 
al., 2012; Gonzalez-Gadea et al., 2016; Rademacher et al., 2010; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009). 
 Resources should also be directed towards testing direct differences between subclinical 
and clinical populations utilizing diverse economic-exchange tasks. This would help researchers 
understand which paradigms are the most effective in eliciting the emotional and neural 
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responses required to model subtle differences in decision-making, anticipatory processing and 
feedback appraisal in diverse populations.  Finally, an avenue to take with future iPD research is 
to provide more direct feedback to the participants as they make repeated exchanges. One could 
either display images of various facial expressions matching the outcome of the trial or provide a 
real-time video feed of their co-player. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no 
precedent for this suggestion and its application would increase the ecological validity of the 
economic-exchange tasks as models of social interaction that are compatible with fMRI and 
possibly more effective at teasing out abnormalities within subclinical populations. Overall, 
clinicians and social neuroscientists will greatly benefit from the information revealed in this 
current study surrounding a barely touched topic.  
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